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NO. 43 OCTOBER 2018 Introduction 
Maritime Nuclear Deterrence 
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles in the South China Sea 
Michael Paul 
China has a modest nuclear deterrent in terms of cost and scale, compared to the 
United States and Russia. Beijing does not strive for the ability to conduct nuclear 
wars, but rather seeks to deter aggression at a low level with a secure second strike 
capability. In contrast to its rapid conventional armament, China has in the past 
modernized its nuclear weapons systems only slowly and in small numbers. It appar-
ently does not strive for equality with the nuclear weapons capability of the US or 
Russia and wants to avoid a symmetrical arms race. Recently, however, the Chinese 
leadership has been pursuing an increasingly ambitious policy of asymmetric nuclear 
armament. Land-based, long-range ballistic missiles are being deployed in a mobile 
mode and equipped with manoeuvrable multiple warheads; hypersonic weapon sys-
tems are being developed, and submarines are now also being equipped with strategic 
nuclear weapons. New missiles can reach the US, even if launched from the South 
China Sea. Deploying nuclear weapons on submarines requires a great deal of effort, 
poses complex challenges and involves high costs. Why did China choose this solution 
and may it represent a turning point in the development of its nuclear strategy? 
 
The Indo-Pacific region is attracting increas-
ing attention because the US’s ability to 
project global power is coming under par-
ticular pressure there. Due to its maritime 
armament, China has become the largest 
naval force in East Asia and is questioning 
the regional supremacy of the United 
States. In the new US security strategy, 
China and Russia are explicitly referred 
to as revisionist powers, as ‘antitheses’ of 
American values and interests. China is 
accused of wanting to oust the US from 
the Indo-Pacific region and taking the 
lead globally. The new great power rivalry 
between the US and China is primarily 
conducted at diplomatic and economic 
levels as well as in the cyber and the infor-
mation space, but can lead to military and, 
therefore, nuclear escalation. 
Unlike Moscow, Beijing has not defined 
its relationship with Washington in terms 
of nuclear equality or even parity. The 
reason for this is not only a fundamentally 
different security situation, but also a dif-
ferent nuclear philosophy. Still mindful of 
the ‘century of humiliation’ (1839–1949), 
China is keen to acquire the latest weapon 
technology in order not to fall behind again 
(and thus into the danger of renewed hu-
miliation). But to strive for parity would 
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require an enormous financial effort due 
to the different balance of power compared 
to the US and Russia, which would come 
at the cost of social peace in the country – 
and thus of regime stability. Nuclear weap-
ons therefore have an important but lim-
ited significance for China’s foreign and 
security policy. 
Mao Tse-tung is often quoted as saying 
that the atomic bomb is only a “paper 
tiger”. But the country's Communist leader-
ship has never underestimated the impor-
tance of nuclear weapons. In the dialectical 
sense, these weapons were, from their point 
of view, paper as well as real tigers: paper 
if you do not fear them and real if you do 
not have them. Foreign powers were able 
to control China using the threat of nuclear 
weapons, something Beijing could not ac-
cept – not least due to the memory of the 
“century of humiliation”. Mao recognised 
the issue of possessing nuclear weapons as 
one which determined China’s fate. 
Mao’s demand that nuclear weapons be 
available only in small numbers but of high 
quality became the official guideline of 
China’s deterrence policy in the 1960s and 
is still valid today. A statement by Major 
General Peng Guangqian in 2004 made it 
clear what considerations Beijing links with 
this approach to a lean and effective weap-
ons arsenal: Even if the US were capable 
of destroying China a hundred times, his 
country would still be victorious if it suc-
ceeded in doing so once. 
The deterrent effect of nuclear weapons 
is absolute and cannot be replaced by other 
weapons, said President Xi Jinping in his 
first speech as General Secretary of the 
Communist Party of China to officers of the 
“Second Artillery” of the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) on 5 December 2012. Since its 
foundation on 1 July 1966, this unit of 
the land forces has been responsible for the 
management of the nuclear weapons ar-
senal. In the 2015 White Paper, the nuclear 
force is referred to as the “cornerstone” on 
which national sovereignty and security 
are based. The increased importance of the 
missile armed forces is illustrated by them 
being upgraded to a separate branch on 31 
December 2015 – the PLA Rocket Force 
(PLARF). However, due to the high degree 
of secrecy, foreign experts are still undecid-
ed as to whether the PLARF or the PLA Navy 
are responsible for missiles on strategic sub-
marines. 
Principles of China’s nuclear 
strategy 
The tautological statement about the defen-
sive nature of its own nuclear strategy (“a 
self-defensive nuclear strategy that is defen-
sive in nature”) is typical for official state-
ments about the Chinese military strategy 
in general. Ambiguity and vagueness, 
which often characterize official declara-
tions, are intended because, with a much 
smaller arsenal of weapons compared to 
the US and Russia, ambiguity is an element 
of deterrence – and even the relatively 
detailed US doctrine does not outline all 
the relevant circumstances of its nuclear 
operations. 
Mao had recognised that nuclear weap-
ons could exert political influence on his 
country. Possessing nuclear weapons was 
definitely an issue that determined China’s 
sovereignty and was therefore indispen-
sable. In developing nuclear weapons and 
determining the parameters for their use, 
Beijing is still guided by the principle of the 
necessary minimum of retaliation, which 
consequently also includes the policy of 
No First Use (NFU). 
Ever since the first nuclear weapons 
test on 16 October 1964, China has always 
declared that it would never and under no 
circumstances be the first to use nuclear 
weapons. This decision may also have been 
the result of tactical considerations. How-
ever, as a Maoist legacy, the commitment 
to NFU has since shaped both declaratory 
policy and arms procurement policy. Most 
recently, it was officially reaffirmed in the 
2015 White Paper. However, it is unclear 
under which conditions nuclear weapons 
would be used. 
In principle, every nuclear weapon state 
must protect its own nuclear weapons from 
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a disarming first strike, but they must not 
be used prematurely in the event of an 
alleged or actual threat of first strike. In 
order to react to a first strike, there are 
essentially two possibilities, being discussed 
in the US since 1960s: namely to launch 
nuclear weapons as soon as a warning is 
issued by satellite (Launch on Warning) or 
after the attack has been confirmed by an 
explosion (Launch under Attack). If enemy 
missiles are fired from submarines, theo-
retically, a decision must be made within a 
few minutes whether or not to launch one’s 
own missiles. However, due to the vulner-
ability of nuclear weapon control facilities, 
it may be too late to give the order to start 
strategic bombers or missiles. In the US and 
Russia, strategic nuclear weapons are there-
fore constantly kept on high alert so that 
they can be launched within a few minutes. 
A false alarm could, therefore, in a crisis 
trigger a nuclear war ‘by accident’, even 
though no attack has taken place. If, how-
ever, nuclear weapons are held back too 
long, there is a risk of their loss and intra-
war deterrence becoming a failure. 
Chinese policymakers face a similar 
dilemma today. On the one hand, NFU 
policy suggests that nuclear weapons will 
only be used after a long period of military 
conflict, in which China’s armed forces are 
in danger of being completely destroyed 
or the state and party leadership is facing 
complete collapse. On the other hand, it 
is conceivable that cyber attacks combined 
with the use of conventional weapons (Con-
ventional Prompt Global Strike, CPGS) in 
a counterforce strike might destroy key 
components of the Chinese command sys-
tem and missile arsenal. The US’s missile 
defence system, with support from allies 
in the region, could then intercept the re-
maining Chinese missiles and thus destroy 
Beijing’s second-strike capability. Of course, 
this scenario requires Washington to be 
willing to take a significant risk. Beijing 
must, however, ensure the security of its 
country even under extreme conditions. In 
both scenarios, no nuclear weapons were 
used: should now nuclear weapons be used 
first? 
China’s nuclear weapons arsenal 
There are no official figures on China’s 
nuclear arsenal. China has relatively few 
nuclear weapons and therefore does not 
want to disclose the precise number. 
Western research institutes estimate the 
number of operational nuclear weapons at 
175 to 190. In addition, there is a reserve, 
so a total of up to 270 nuclear weapons 
is assumed. Quantitatively, China ranks 
fourth among the five officially recognised 
nuclear weapons states – in order of the 
size of their nuclear arsenals, they are Rus-
sia, the United States, France, China and the 
United Kingdom. 
Nevertheless China has the world’s 
largest arsenal of ballistic missiles. These 
are mainly conventional short-range mis-
siles. Their strategic launch vehicles are 
land-based medium-range and interconti-
nental ballistic missiles; China also has 
48 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles 
(SLBMs). Bombers have so far played a 
secondary role. In 2017, however, Beijing 
announced the construction of new stra-
tegic bombers (allegedly armed with bal-
listic missiles). In contrast to the US and 
Russia, China does not (yet) have a com-
parably robust triad of land, air and sea-
based strategic deterrence systems. This 
makes the vulnerability of most of the 
triad – its land-based systems – all the 
more critical. 
Focus on land-based 
ballistic missiles 
Land-based ballistic missiles are the preferred 
carrier system for nuclear weapon states 
because they are technically the simplest 
and most cost-effective. They are the main 
component of China’s deterrent arsenal. 
Firmly bunkered in silos, however, they 
make an easy target for enemy disarmament 
strikes. Mobile launchers therefore make 
the better carrier systems. These are gener-
ally road and all-terrain vehicles, but also 
include rail-mounted transport vehicles. 
But tremendous advances in sensor tech-
nology, resolution, data acquisition and 
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data transmission, now even make mobile 
missiles hidden on land more detectable 
than ever before. Moreover, in the past, 
only land-based ballistic missiles were con-
sidered capable of destroying enemy mis-
siles, as they are always kept on high alert 
and have great accuracy. Nowadays, a Tri-
dent SLBM of the US Navy even has a higher 
probability of hitting and destroying bun-
kered targets. As a result, hundreds of addi-
tional warheads are available for counter-
force strikes, bringing into question the 
deterrence capability of potential US oppo-
nents, at least in important parts. 
Approaches to increasing the 
survivability of China’s nuclear 
weapons 
There are several ways to increase the 
survivability of nuclear weapons and thus 
the credibility of deterrence. The simplest 
method is to artificially fortify stationing 
sites such as silos, aircraft hangars and 
submarine bases or to use natural protec-
tion. For example, China hides long-range 
missiles in tunnel systems throughout its 
mountain regions. In addition, the procure-
ment of a sufficient number of warheads 
and the availability of different carrier 
systems can ensure redundancy. Further-
more, in China’s case, the size of the coun-
try and the breadth and depth of the sea 
provide simple protection. China’s sub-
marine-launched missiles can best meet the 
two criteria for greater survivability in the 
event of an attack, namely redundancy and 
diversification. 
Characteristics and consequences 
of sea-based systems 
Sea-based nuclear weapons systems are 
of paramount importance for safe second-
strike capability and thus for ensuring 
nuclear deterrence. As early as June 1958, 
China therefore decided to build subma-
rines to carry nuclear weapons. The US and 
Russia served as prestigious role models, 
having launched the first nuclear sub-
marines (the USS Nautilus and Leninsky Kom-
somol) some years earlier. After Moscow had 
denied the Communist leadership in Beijing 
further technological support, the project 
became a matter of national honour. Mao 
said that China would build nuclear sub-
marines, even if it took 10,000 years. A 
difficult economic situation, shortcomings 
in the production infrastructure and politi-
cal events meant that the project was re-
peatedly interrupted. A suitable submarine 
wasn’t produced until 1981 which was fol-
lowed by the successful test flight of an 
SLBM of the type “Ju Lang” (JL). These mis-
siles served as a model for the current JL-2 
(CSS-NX-14) SLBM with a range of up to 
7,200 kilometres. 
China has constructed various nuclear-
powered submarines since 2002: in addi-
tion to attack submarines, four SLBM-armed 
(SSBN) Jin class (Type 094) submarines, each 
capable of carrying 12 JL-2 missiles. These 
boats are stationed at the Yulin naval base 
on Hainan. Further submarines are planned. 
Type 094B submarines are to be equipped 
with JL-2A SLBMs with a range of 11,200 
kilometres and would thus be able to reach 
the US without having to leave the protec-
tion of their naval base in the South China 
Sea. By the early 2020s, third-generation 
SSBNs (type 096) are to be equipped with 
JL-3 SLBMs which will also have an 
intercontinental range. 
This will significantly change the threat 
situation for Washington. So far, around 
20 Chinese intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles would be capable of reaching the US. 
Now 48 SLBMs will be added, the number 
of which can grow from a total of six sub-
marines up to 72 missiles with nuclear 
warheads (and so far these are still only 
single warheads and not up to eight multi-
ple warheads, as are common in US and 
Russian SSBN fleets). 
According to the Pentagon, the four Jin 
boats represent “China’s first credible mari-
time nuclear deterrent”. But the Chinese 
leadership is facing a volatile mix of prob-
lems if it wants to secure this maritime 
deterrent: The high operating noise of Chi-
nese boats makes it easier for the enemy 
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to locate the submarine and thus to hunt 
it. More than 50 years after the first launch, 
Chinese submarines are still as noisy as 
Soviet submarines of the 1970s. China must 
therefore continue to work on the develop-
ment of quieter engines. In addition, it has 
barely made any progress in acquiring Anti-
Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities com-
pared to those of the US: In particular, the 
PLA lacks the ability to coordinate its own 
submarine hunters beyond the “first chain 
of islands”. However, this may be a delib-
erately chosen restriction due to the geo-
strategic focus on the area within the first 
chain of islands. This area also includes the 
Yellow Sea, bordered by Korea and Japan, 
the western part of the East China Sea with 
Taiwan and the South China Sea. 
Strategic submarines must be perma-
nently armed on patrol in the Pacific or 
Indian Oceans if they are to ensure second-
strike capability in the event of a conflict, 
but should not become an easy target for 
enemy naval aviation in the relatively clear 
marginal seas of the Pacific. However, if 
Beijing chooses this solution, the China’s 
Central Military Commission would have to 
transfer responsibility for the use of nuclear 
weapons to naval officers (and presumably 
accompanying political officers) on board, 
and ensure trouble-free communication 
over long distances. Just navigating such 
a submarine (called a ‘boomer’ in the US) 
with its large and complex operating and 
weapons systems requires constant practice 
with a well-trained crew. In addition, the 
Chinese Navy has no experience with long 
patrols under realistic operational condi-
tions and, presumably, the submarine on 
the longest patrol mission to date (95 days) 
was not armed with operational missiles. 
In this respect, the patrols of the 094 sub-
marines primarily serve to test crews and 
material before future strategic submarines 
take on the task of credibly guaranteeing 
China’s maritime nuclear deterrence in the 
oceans of the world – probably in Arctic 
and Indo-Pacific operational areas. 
A ‘bastion’ for Chinese sub-
marines in the South China Sea 
As soon as Chinese submarine commanders 
want to head for the Pacific, they have to 
pass through transit routes that are moni-
tored by the US Navy and allied forces. The 
South Fleet is currently responsible for pro-
tecting China’s strategic missile submarines 
that operationally covers the South China 
Sea with its headquarters in Zhanjiang. In 
contrast, the Yellow Sea is relatively shal-
low with an average depth of only 46 metres, 
so in the language of submariners it is a 
flooded meadow. 
The bastion concept is similar to the 
Soviet Navy’s approach during the Cold 
War. The Red Fleet also tried to evade the 
ASW capabilities of the US and its allies 
due to the loud operating noises of its boats 
by visiting a shelter controlled by its own 
armed forces in the Sea of Okhotsk. If they 
wanted to leave the Pacific Rim Sea, Soviet 
submarines – like the Chinese today – 
were all the more vulnerable because the 
Kuriles were the hunting grounds of US and 
Japanese anti-submarine units. 
In China’s case, the South China Sea 
offers effective protection. As part of the 
Western Pacific, this largest and deepest 
marginal sea in the world is bordered to the 
north and west by the continental margin 
of the Asian mainland mass (China and 
Vietnam) and to the south by the Malay 
Peninsula and Borneo. In the east, the 
Philippine island chain separates the South 
China Sea from the Pacific Ocean. Although 
just over half of all shelf areas have depths 
of less than 200 metres, the central deep-sea 
plain has an average water depth of 4,100 
metres, with the deepest being in the south-
ern Manila Trench at more than 5000 metres. 
The Strait of Luzon connects the South 
China Sea with the Pacific Ocean between 
Taiwan and Luzon with a width of 380 kilo-
metres and a depth of 2,600 metres (see 
map, p. 6). 
The first 094-type strategic Jin submarine 
is already based in the underground sub-
marine bunker of the Yulin Marine Base, 
located southeast of Sanya City on Hainan 
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Island. The other four Jin submarines are 
also based there. Presumably, the next 
generation of submarines launched in the 
early 2020s and equipped with JL-3 SLBMs, 
will initially be based there too. The larger 
range of the JL-2A SLBMs already allow mis-
siles launched from 094B-type submarines 
to reach destinations in the US from this 
region. So it is no coincidence that China 
reacts particularly nervously to US ships 
going on reconnaissance voyages near the 
outposts claimed by Beijing and the transit 
routes in this area. In December 2016, for 
example, the Chinese Navy confiscated an 
underwater drone from the USNS Bowditch 
near Scarborough Reef, which had been 
recording oceanographic data. Ultimately, 
Beijing not only wants its maritime deter-
rence, but also its denial strategy (Anti-
Access/Area Denial, A2/AD) to be secured 
in this area. 
In the future, satellites are to ensure 
“total, uninterrupted surveillance” of the 
sea and shipping traffic, in order to obtain 
“effective information for China to manage 
and control the South China Sea”. This will 
improve the range of capabilities of Chinese 
outposts which use their sensors and effec-
Map 
China’s “Island Chains” 
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tors to act on enemy aircraft and ships, thus 
not only trying to deter US forces from in-
tervening (e.g., to protect Taiwan), but also 
protecting submarines on patrol. Contrary 
to international law and the ruling of the 
arbitral tribunal in The Hague in July 2016, 
China continues to maintain its claim to 
control up to 86 percent of the South China 
Sea. Outposts around the Spratly Islands 
(Chinese: Nansha) have been fortified so 
much they are now referred to as ‘island 
fortresses’. As a particularly striking sign 
of China’s claim to ownership of the South 
China Sea, the expansion of these military 
infrastructure projects is likely to continue. 
After all, President Xi considers the progress 
made in transforming former reefs and 
sandbanks to be one of the most important 
achievements of his first years in office. As 
a result, some have predicted that China 
will gain full control of air and sea links in 
the Western Pacific over the next decade. 
Strategic submarines, however, will only 
be stationed in the South China Sea tempo-
rarily. Chinese submarines are still too noisy 
to find protection in the open sea and to 
present a credible nuclear deterrent. For 
reasons of national prestige and in line 
with the legacy of Mao, China will in the 
future want to send its strategic submarines 
out on patrol in the world’s oceans, just 
like the US and Russia. Given the remark-
able progress made in recent years, this is 
only a matter of time. 
Dr. Michael Paul is a Senior Fellow in the International Security Division at SWP. 
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